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OPPOSITES IN A DIALOGICAL SELF: 
CONSTRUCTS AS CHARACTERS 
HUBERT J. M. HERMANS 
University of Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands 
Bakhtin’s (1 973) polyphonic novel serves as a metaphor for a dialogical conception of 
the self. In line with this metaphor, it is argued that a narrative approach leads to a 
multivoiced conception of the self, in which the poles of a personal construct are 
related as opposing characters positioned in an imaginal space. In this space, the I 
fluctuates among positions in a dialogical fashion. Two main features of the relation 
between positions are discussed: intersubjective communication and dominance. These 
features form the basis of a theory and methodology that have led to the discovery of 
a particular phenomenon: dominance reversal. This phenomenon represents a radical 
change in the dominance relation of contrasting positions within a limited time 
period, in an apparent absence of causal factors. The implications of this phenom- 
enon for the organization and reorganization of the self are discussed. 
The experience of opposites is a dynamic phenomenon par excellence. 
The existence of polar opposites in the human mind requires an order- 
ing, in which the contrasting elements are combined, reconciled, sepa- 
rated, or treated in some other way. Not surprisingly, the existence of 
opposites and their organization have received special attention in 
psychological theories, from both the social and clinical perspectives. 
From the perspective of social psychology, Festinger (1957) ob- 
served that people, striving toward consistency within themselves, try 
to remove inconsistencies among opposing or conflicting attitudes con- 
cerning a particular subject. On the basis of this observation, Festinger 
formulated the hypothesis that “the existence of dissonance, being 
psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try to re- 
duce the dissonance and achieve consonance” (p. 3). In a similar vein, 
Heider (1958) dealt with the contrast between positive and negative 
evaluations of persons and objects. Instead of the terms consonance 
and dissonance, he used the terms balance and imbalance. A balanced 
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2 H. J. M. Hermans 
state is characterized by harmonious relations between elements and 
an imbalanced state by contrasting, or nonfitting, relations. If a bal- 
anced state does not exist, forces toward this state will be mobilized, 
because a continuation of a state of imbalance will produce tension. A 
related development was Osgood and Tannenbaum’s (1955) principle 
of congruity: “Changes in evaluation are always in the direction of 
increased congruity with the existing frame of reference’’ (p. 43). When 
incongruity is felt between perceived elements, there is a pressure in 
the direction of increased congruity. Thus Festinger, Heider, and Osgood 
and Tannenbaum concurred that a state of dissonance, imbalance, or 
incongruity creates a tension that motivates the person to change the 
relation between perceived elements in such a way that tension is 
reduced. 
Whereas the classic theorists in social psychology concentrated on 
the process of tension reduction between polar opposites, a diversity 
of early authors, mainly with a clinical orientation, emphasized the 
importance of synthesis, or reconciliation, of opposites (McAdams, 1985). 
They shared the idea that psychological contrasts are in one way or 
another mutually complementary and, as such, a necessity for the 
development of a mature self. Jung is probably the most notable theo- 
rist in the clinical field who conceived of personality as an organization 
of opposites. Jung argued that the domain of the conscious stands in 
opposition to the domain of the unconscious, the individual uncon- 
scious stands in opposition to the collective unconscious, extroversion is 
opposed to introversion. Archetypes are often arranged as opposites: 
the wise old man, or senex, versus the child, or p e r ;  the earth mother 
versus the sky father. From a clinical-developmental perspective, Jung 
(1959) devised the concept of individuation to comprehend the basic 
human tendency to develop in the direction of a synthesis of polar 
opposites. In the process of individuation, opposites come to be recon- 
ciled as the result of a maturing self. The integration of the self is an 
accomplishment usually saved for the second half of life (Jung, 1959). 
Sullivan’s (1953) concept of personification is another influential 
example of personality organization in which opposites play a central 
role. According to Sullivan, personified images of the self, such as the 
”good me” and the “bad me,” and personified images of others, such 
as the ”good mother” and the ”bad mother,” are organized together 
into the child‘s self-system. These personified images enable the child 
to orchestrate his or her interactions with the environment in such a 
way as to minimize anxiety. As the child grows older, the good mother 
and the bad mother fuse, together with other aspects of the mother, 
into larger configurations. Such a configuration develops into a more 
integrative representation of the mother as a whole. For a related 
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Opposites in a Dialogical Self 3 
view, see discussions of the concept of internalization in the object- 
relations literature (Fairbairn, 1952; Guntrip, 1971; Jacobson, 1964; Klein, 
1948) and of the three ego states-”parent,” “adult,” and “child,”-in 
the transactional analysis literature (Berne, 1972; Steiner, 1974). 
In addition to Jung and Sullivan, a variety of students of human 
nature have argued that maturation of the self involves a reconcilia- 
tion of opposites. Bakan (1966) argued for a balance between agency 
(self-maintenance and self-expansion) and communion. Adler (1922) 
considered not only perfection but also Gerneinschaftsstreben (striving 
for community) as personal goals of human development. Angyal(l965) 
discussed the balance between two mutually complementing forces: 
autonomy (self-determination) and homonomy (self-surrender). Simi- 
larly, Loevinger (1976) described the reconciliation of autonomy and 
interdependence at the highest stages of ego development. Klages 
(1948) considered Bindung (solidification) and Losung (dissolution) as 
two complementary components of human character. From a clinical- 
developmental point of view, Gutmann (1980) observed a blending of 
masculinity and femininity after midlife. In a study of mystic and 
meditative experiences, Deikman (1971, 1976) distinguished between 
an action mode and a receptive mode of consciousness and empha- 
sized that the mature person is able to alternate between the two. 
Fowler (1981) described the rapprochement of the rational and the 
ecstatic at the highest stage of human faith. 
As the preceding review suggests, both academic social psychol- 
ogy and clinical-developmental treatises on the self show a clear in- 
terest in the phenomenon of opposites in human experience. There is, 
however, a notable difference between the two streams of thought. 
The academic tradition is mainly interested in the analysis of judg- 
ment and in the process of tension reduction. In the process of ten- 
sion reduction, one of the contrasting elements becomes dominant 
over the other one so that the specific position of the other (incompat- 
ible) element is given up. In contrast, the clinical-developmental tradi- 
tion considers polar opposites as mutually complementing and is fo- 
cused on their synthesis as a necessity for a maturing self. As far as 
there is a tension between the polar opposites, it is not reduced but 
rather functions as a challenge for their integration. In principle, the 
two elements of a pair of opposites are treated as equally important 
and as mutually fertilizing. 
Kelly’s (1955) work occupies a special position with reference to the 
preceding classification. Apart from the fact that he can be considered 
both a social psychologist and a clinical psychologist, his treatment 
of opposites has certain similarities with both the social and clinical 
groups. The implication of opposites in a personal construct is most 
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4 H. 1. M. Herrnans 
clearly expressed in the Dichotomy Corollary, which states that a per- 
son’s construction system is composed of a finite number of dichoto- 
mous constructs. Both parts of this dichotomy are essential for the 
definition of the construct, with the implication that a construct system 
is, on a priori grounds, organized along opposites. In this respect, 
Kelly’s view corresponds clearly with the clinical tradition that consid- 
ers polar opposites as mutually defining and complementing. On the 
other hand, Kelly (1955) gave explicit attention to the role of tension 
reduction in close correspondence with a discussion of anxiety. In the 
face of anxiety, an individual may, as a protective device, “submerge” 
one end of a construct or suspend elements of it that do not fit well into 
a particular construct. In this respect, Kelly was close to the social 
psychological theorists when they observed that uncomfortable feelings 
associated with a state of dissonance lead to tension reduction and to 
the dominance of one oppositional pole over the other. 
In the spirit of Kelly, in this article, I treat the poles of a construct 
not only as mutually complementary and defining, but also in their 
relative dominance, one pole temporarily taking precedence over the 
other. In one respect, however, I move beyond the Dichotomy Corol- 
lary. I consider the two poles of a personal construct as if they were 
characters involved in dialogical relationships. As interacting charac- 
ters in a narrative, the two poles are considered as protagonist and 
antagonist and therefore as belonging together in mutually comple- 
mentary and defining ways. At the same time, I suppose that the 
characters are involved in dominance relationships, with one taking a 
more prominent position in the dialogue than the other. In fact, this 
means that I follow the two characters over time, paying special atten- 
tion to changes in their relative dominance. 
Herein I give an exposition of Bakhtin’s (1929/1973) metaphor of 
the “polyphonic novel,” which lays a foundation for the use of the 
term self-narrative, in which opposing ”characters” are dialogically re- 
lated. I argue that these characters tell their specific self-narratives in 
terms of contrasting systems of personal valuations (units of mean- 
ing). I conclude the article with an idiographic study that illustrates 
the presented theoretical framework, paying special attention to the 
relative dominance of the characters and their changes over time. 
THE POLYPHONIC NOVEL AS A METAPHOR 
FOR THE DIALOGICAL SELF 
In Problems of Dostoyevskfs Poetics, the Russian literary scholar Mikhail 
Bakhtin (1929/1973) proposed that Dostoyevsky, one of the most bril- 
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Opposites in a Dialogical Self 5 
liant innovators in the history of novelistic literature, introduced a 
new artistic form, the polyphonic novel. The importance of Bakhtin’s 
work for psychology has recently been discussed by Vasil’eva (1988), 
Florenskaya (1989), Wertsch (1991), and Hermans and Kempen (1993). 
Bakhtin’s ideas represent a significant contribution to understanding 
the dialogical nature of the self and may be elaborated on by more 
recent psychological work. 
The principle feature of the polyphonic novel is that it is com- 
posed of a number of independent and mutually opposing viewpoints 
embodied by characters involved in dialogical relationships. The inter- 
acting characters are not to be seen as the creation of one author, 
Dostoyevsky himself, who as an omniscient author is “above“ his char- 
acters and understands them from a centralized viewpoint. Rather, 
each character is “ideologically authoritative and independent,” that 
is, the author of his or her own legitimate ideological position. The 
characters are not slaves to Dostoyevsky’s artistic intentions, but are 
capable of standing beside their creator, disagreeing with him, even 
rebelling against him. 
Bakhtin (1929/1973) held that in Dostoyevsky’s novels there is not 
one single author, but several authors or thinkers-Myshkin, Stavogin, 
Raskolnikov, Ivan Karamazov, the Grand Inquisitor-each having his 
own voice and telling his own story. These characters do not function 
within a unified objective world, subordinated to Dostoyevsky’s indi- 
vidual vision, but are ”a plurality of consciousnesses,” represented by 
voices who come across as the authors of their own ideology. When 
different characters meet one another within the framework of a book, 
they oppose and accompany one another in a dialogical fashion. As in 
a polyphonic musical composition, the several voices have different 
spatial positions and accompany and oppose each other in a dialogical 
relation. 
Logical Versus Dialogical Relationships 
For a proper understanding of the notion of dialogue, it is neces- 
sary to establish the difference between logical and dialogical relation- 
ships. Bakhtin (1929/1973) gave the example of two completely identi- 
cal phrases, ”life is good and ”life is good.” When one considers 
these phrases from the perspective of Aristotelian logic, they are re- 
lated in terms of identity. In fact, they are one and the same state- 
ment. From a dialogical point of view, however, they are two remarks 
expressed by the voices of two spatially separated people in commu- 
nication, who in this case have a relationship of agreement. The phrases 
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6 H. I. M. Hermans 
are identical from a logical point of view but different as utterances: 
The first is a statement and the second a confirmation. Similarly, the 
phrases ”life is good and “life is not good” can be compared. From a 
logical perspective, one is a negation of the other. As utterances from 
two different speakers, however, they are part of a dialogical relation 
of disagreement. The relationship of agreement and disagreement is, 
like a question and answer, a basic dialogical form. To prevent misun- 
derstanding of Bakhtin‘s position, I wish to add that he certainly did 
not reject the rules of logic. Instead, he concluded: “Dialogical rela- 
tionships are totally impossible without logical and concrete semantic 
relationships, but they are not reducible to them; they have their own 
specificity” (Bakhtin, p. 152). 
Dostoyevsky’s novel The Double is an example of the working of 
dialogical relationships. In this novel, the second hero (the double) is 
to be understood as a personification of the interior voice of the first 
hero (Golyadkin). Externalization of the “inner” thought of the first 
hero into an utterance of the second hero results in the spontaneous 
occurrence of dialogical relations between the two parties. The exter- 
nalization of the interior voice of the first hero in a spatially separated 
opponent creates a situation in which the two heroes and their thoughts 
are not simply identical but differ as a result of their spatial opposi- 
tion. In the resulting dialogue, each character can tell, as an indepen- 
dent author and from a specific position, a story about him- or herself. 
Along these lines, Bakhtin (1929/1973) realized a “spatialization of the 
psyche” that he summarized in this way: “This persistent urge to see 
all things as being coexistent and to perceive and depict all things side 
by side and simultaneously, as if in space rather than time, leads him 
[Dostoyevsky] to dramatize in space even the inner contradictions 
and stages of development of a single person” (p. 23). In this narrative 
construction, a plurality of consciousness is presupposed and, corre- 
spondingly, a plurality of worlds that are neither identical nor unified 
but rather heterogeneous and even opposed. With this device, Dostoyev- 
sky portrays characters conversing with the devil (Ivan and the devil), 
with their alter egos (Ivan and Smerdyakov), and even with carica- 
tures of themselves (Raskolnikov and Svidrigailov). 
An apparent feature of logical relationships is that they are “closed 
insofar as they do not permit any conclusion beyond the limits of the 
rules that govern the relationship. Once the identity or negation the- 
sis has been applied to a set of statements, there is nothing left to be 
said; neither is an opening created to the domain of the unexpected 
and unexplored. The openness of consciousness in Dostoyevsky’s he- 
roes, in contrast, continuously resists any final conclusion: ”His self- 
consciousness lives on its unfinalizedness, its open-endedness and in- 
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Opposites in a Dialogical Self 7 
determinacy” (Bakhtin, 1929h973, p. 43), and “every thought of Dostoev- 
sky’s heroes . . . feels itself to be a speech in an uncompleted dialog” 
(Bakhtin, 1929h973, p. 27). For Bakhtin (1929/1973), openness was an 
intrinsic feature of dialogue and its recognition a necessary condition 
for the understanding of individual life: “The genuine life of the per- 
sonality can be penetrated only dialogically, and then only when it 
mutually and voluntarily opens itself” (p, 48). 
The conception of dialogue that is central to Bakhtin’s (1929/1973) 
theory is not only open and “unfinalized,” but also highly personal. 
Dostoyevsky’s world is ”profoundly personalized and each character 
is a “concrete consciousness, embodied in the living voice of an inte- 
gral person” (Bakhtin, p. 7). A particular utterance is never isolated 
from the consciousness of a particular spatially localized character. 
Moreover, the utterance of one particular character is always implic- 
itly or explicitly, in reality or imagination, responding to that of an- 
other character, and therefore, “a dialogical reaction personifies every 
utterance to which it reacts” (Bakhtin, p. 152). Whereas logical state- 
ments, based on impersonal rules as they are, can be easily isolated 
from the speaker, this is impossible for dialogical utterances. Dialogues 
can be understood only when the particularities and personal inten- 
tions of the two interactors are taken into account. 
Dialogue and the Contact with Imaginal Others 
In an extensive discussion of the role of ”invisible guests” in the self, 
Watkins (1986) argued that in most psychological theories, imaginal 
phenomena are most often approached from the perspective of the 
real. Ontologcal priority is clearly given to the existence of real others 
and to “reality” in general, whereas imaginal others are typically seen 
as derivative from and subordinate to this “objective” reality. Never- 
theless, our daily lives are filled with imaginal dialogues. Taking place 
alongside actual dialogues with real others and interwoven with them, 
they constitute a central part of our narrative construction of the world. 
Even when we are outwardly silent, we may be communicating with 
our parents, our critics, our consciences, our gods, our reflection in the 
mirror, with the photograph of someone we miss, a figure from a 
movie or a dream, our babies, or our pets. One could even argue that 
we are never completely alone, because there are always inner con- 
versations with imaginal others, or at least a longing for contact with 
those others. 
Despite their invisible quality, imaginal others are typically per- 
ceived as having a spatially separated position. This is true not only of 
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8 H. J. M. Hermans 
our own culture (e.g., imaginal contact with a wise advisor, a de- 
ceased parent or friend or an ideal lover), but also of non-Western 
communities. As Warneck (1909; cited by Watkins, 1986) has described, 
the Bataks of Sumatra hold the belief that the spirit, who determines 
the character and fortune of a person, is a person within a person, a 
special being with its own will and desires. Similarly, Cassirer (1955) 
emphasized that in mythical consciousness, a tutelary spirit is con- 
ceived not as the central core of someone’s inner life, but as some- 
thing with its own existence, “which dwells in man, which is spatially 
connected with him and hence can also be spatially separated from 
him” (cited by Watkins, 1986, p. 93). 
The role of imaginal interactions, in both Western and non-West- 
ern cultures, has received special attention from cultural anthropolo- 
gists. One of them, Caughey (1984), did fieldwork in Micronesia and 
Pakistan and observed that imaginal interactions were in no way re- 
stricted to non-Western cultures. By his estimation, the “real” social 
world of most North Americans includes between 200 and 300 people 
(e.g., family, friends, acquaintances, and colleagues) and, besides these 
real others, a vast number of imaginal others. Caughey classified these 
imaginal others into three groups: (a) media figures with whom the 
individual engages in imaginal interactions; @) purely imaginary fig- 
ures produced in dreams and fantasies; and (c) imaginal replicas of 
parents, friends, or lovers who are treated as if they were really present. 
Caughey demonstrated, as Watkins (1986) did, that imaginal dialogues 
and interactions exist side by side with real interactions (e.g., “What 
would my father say if he saw me now?”) and may or may not have 
a direct link with reality. 
Caughey (1984) argued that the conflation of “social relationships” 
with only “actual social relationships” is based on “an ethnocentric 
projection of certain narrow assumptions in Western science” (p. 17). 
Not surprisingly, he preferred to speak of an imaginal ”social world,” 
rather than a purely “inner world in order to emphasize the interac- 
tion with someone who is felt to be “there,” as a fellow member of a 
spatial configuration of which the person intrinsically feels a part. A 
similar view was expressed by Bruner (1986), who criticized the phrase 
“private self,” for the reason that the self, even in its most inner realms, 
is never purely private. 
Dialogue and Dominance 
In a study of the interplay of participants’ initiatives and responses in 
conversations, Linell (1990) observed emergent patterns of symmetry 
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Opposites in a Dialogical Self 9 
versus asymmetry (or dominance). Along with Wrong (1968), Linell 
maintained that asymmetry exists in each individual act-response 
sequence. The speaker has a certain privilege in being able to take 
initiatives and display his or her view. This privilege, however, is not 
the permanent “ownership” of only one party involved in the interac- 
tion. In the continuous reciprocity of influence, the actors continually 
alternate the roles of ”power holder” and “power subject.” In other 
words, turn-taking is inherent in conversational interaction, and this 
implies that as long as the conversation develops, the interactors are 
dominant in turn. 
A second reason why conversations are more or less asymmetrical 
follows from the fact that they are always embedded in a broader 
social context. In the tradition of Bakhtin and Vygotsky, who were 
concerned with intersubjectivity from a cultural and historical per- 
spective, Linell (1990) emphasized that meanings in interaction are 
not entirely constructed ab novo. Because interactions are culturally 
and institutionally structured and prescribed, dialogical relationships 
characteristically differ in these role alternations. Under the influence 
of these prescriptions, one party comes out as more dominant than 
the other. Parents, for example, are in a position to make extensive 
use of the dominance aspect of the dialogue in relation to their chil- 
dren. Bruner (1985) observed that in conversing with a small child, an 
adult serves almost as the vicarious consciousness of the child. The 
adult behaves as if he or she is the only one who knows the goal of 
the activity in which the two of them are engaged. It is quite easy for 
parents to “steal” the child’s turn or to correct or reformulate the 
child’s contribution. In a study of pediatric consultations in an allergy 
clinic, Aronsson and Rundstrom (1988) observed that parents routinely 
stepped in as the spokespersons for their children (ages 5-15 years). 
Even when the doctor addressed the children, the mothers simply 
took their children’s turn or came in right after. They then ratified 
and reinforced what their children said and explained what they meant, 
implying that the children cannot, or do not have the opportunity to, 
express it properly themselves (Linell, 1990). 
In contrast, informal adult conversations, between friends in par- 
ticular, often have a high degree of symmetry. Such dialogues are 
brought forward by both interlocutors in a cooperative way. The ini- 
tiative is not continuously on the part of one interlocutor, but alter- 
nates in a fluent way. In this alternation, the speakers contribute to a 
mutually constructed interpretation of the situation at hand. As a con- 
sequence, they display their unfolding understanding of the joint dis- 
course on a play-by-play basis, and ideas emerge in the process itself. 
The symmetrical dialogue should be considered a construction, even a 
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H. J. M. Hermans 10 
co-construction of the two parties involved (Linell, 1990). (For addi- 
tional analyses of power and dominance with reference to Mead’s 
theory of symbolic interactionism, see Gregg, 1991; Hermans & Kempen, 
1993.) 
As Sampson (1993) recently observed, Bakhtin apparently neglected 
the role of power in discussing dialogue. This observation may be 
supported by a brief return to Bakhtin’s analysis of Dostoyevsky’s 
The Double. From the beginning of the novel, there is an antagonistic 
relationship between Golyadkin and his double. The double goes to 
Golyadkin’s house, takes his place, and even dresses himself in Golyad- 
kin’s clothes. In Golyadkin’s work situation, the double competes with 
him so that the double gets an even better reputation in the eyes of 
the superiors than Golyadkin himself. The continuous rivalry results 
in Golyadkin’s downfall at the end of the book. In other words, in his 
analysis of this novel, and others in Dostoyevsky’s oeuvre, Bakhtin 
seemed to concentrate on the notion of (full-fledged) dialogue to the 
neglect of the apparent power differences and power games in which 
Dostoyevsky’s characters are involved. 
In sum, it can be concluded that there are two defining character- 
istics of dialogical relationships: intersubjective exchange and domi- 
nance. That is, dialogical relationships vary on a continuum ranging 
from symmetrical to asymmetrical. An interrogation is an example of 
a strongly asymmetrical dialogue, whereas an informal conversation 
among two friends is of a more symmetrical kind. The notion of domi- 
nance applies not only to actual interactions, but also to imaginal 
interactions. When somebody is under the spell of a fortune-teller’s 
prediction, or under the dictates of an authoritarian father or mother, 
his or her imaginal dialogues may be highly asymmetrical. The pro- 
ductive imaginal contact a person has with a wise advisor, or the 
imaginal communication a scientist has with an inspiring colleague, 
represents dialogical contact that has a high degree of symmetry. 
The Dialogical Self: A Spatiotemporal Construction 
Guided by the polyphonic metaphor, Hermans et al. (1992) and Hermans 
and Kempen (1993) criticized the idea that the self is organized around 
one center or core. (Sampson, 1993, criticized the core conception on 
cultural grounds.) Just as in the polyphonic novel there is not one 
centralized author with a unifymg view of the world, but rather a 
multiplicity of authors, so the self may be conceived of as a multiplic- 
ity of relatively autonomous “I positions” that are organized in an 
imaginal landscape. In this conception, the I has the possibility to 
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Opposites in a Dialogical Self 11 
move, as in a space, from one position to the other in accordance with 
changes in situation and time. The I fluctuates among different, and 
even opposed, positions and has the capacity to imaginatively endow 
each position with a voice so that dialogical relations between posi- 
tions can be established. The voices function like interacting charac- 
ters in a story, involved in a process of question and answer, agree- 
ment and disagreement. Each character has a story to tell about its 
own experiences from its own stance. These characters exchange in- 
formation about their respective Mes, resulting in a complex, narra- 
tively structured self. In this multiplicity of positions, some positions 
may become more dominant than others, so that the voices of the less 
dominant positions may be subdued. 
In fact, the dialogcal self, as formulated above, is a narrative trans- 
lation of James's (1890) classic distinction between I and Me. As Sarbin 
(1986) proposed, the I can be conceived as an active agent able to tell, 
as an author, a story about him- or herself as an actor. In an attempt 
to move beyond Sarbin's proposal, Hermans and Kempen (1993), guided 
by the polyphonic novel, conceived of the self not as one (centralized) 
I, but as a (decentralized) multiplicity of I positions, among which 
dialogical relationships develop. The gist of this view is that the self is 
multivoiced. When people have developed one I position that they 
consider to be their ''usual self," this is not to be mistaken for an 
essential unity of the self. Rather, as Sampson (1993) argued, the usual 
self is to be understood as the end point of a development that has 
been determined by social training in a culture that fosters a central- 
ized idea of the self. In actual fact, the usual I or any common self- 
definition may be overruled at times-for example, when the person 
is involved in an erotic adventure, in an extremely inspiring scientific 
discovery, in a burst of artistic creativity, in a situation in which feel- 
ings of revenge make for a decisive plan, or in an extraordinary expe- 
rience under the influence of drugs. 
There is an important difference between the dialogical self and 
recent formulations of the self by narrative psychologists. Sarbin (1990), 
Sarbin and Mancuso (1983), Bruner (1986), and Gergen and Gergen 
(1988), some of the main advocates of a narrative approach, have 
emphasized the temporal dimension of narratives. Bmner's (1986) sentence 
"The king died, and then the queen" nicely illustrates this emphasis. 
Gergen and Gergen (1988)' in their conception of self-narrative, also 
saw "time" and "coherence among events'' as the defining characteris- 
tics of narrative and classified narratives according to their movement 
over time toward a desirable end state. 
The dialogical self certainly acknowledges the temporal dimen- 
sion as a constitutive feature of stories or narratives. Without time, 
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12 H. J. M. Hermans 
there is no story. However, in correspondence with Bakhtin’s (1929/ 
1973) emphasis on the spatial dimension, time and space are of equal 
importance for the narrative structure oi the dialogical self. The spa- 
tial nature of the self is expressed in the term position, a term that is 
more dynamic and flexible than the traditional term role (cf H a d  & 
Van Langenhove, 1991). Bakhtin (1929/1973) emphasized the spatial 
nature of narrative by using the term juxtaposition. In this narrative 
spatialization, a plurality of voices that are neither identical nor uni- 
fied, but rather heterogeneous and even opposed, is supposed. As 
part of a narrative juxtaposition, characters are portrayed as convers- 
ing with other, often opposing characters. As Bakhtin described, it is 
even possible to translate temporal relations into spatial structures by 
juxtaposing different periods of life. When moving in an imaginal 
space, people can shift from the present to the past or future and back 
to the present. When they come back to the present, they have more or 
less been changed by the dialogical process itself. For example, people 
can imaginatively move to a future point in time and speak to them- 
selves about the sensibility of what they are doing now in the present 
situation. This position, some point in the future, may help them evaluate 
their present activities from a long-term perspective. The result may 
be that they consider their present self as being blind to more “essen- 
tial’’ things. 
Instead of a movement through time toward a desirable end state 
(Gergen & Gergen, 1988), the Bakhtinian approach allows a more open- 
ended kind of narrative. According to this approach, there is not a 
continuous movement from a beginning to an end (e.g., the movie 
with an happy ending), but rather a combination of oppositional ele- 
ments of a rather discontinuous nature, as can be seen in modern 
novelistic literature (e.g., Joyce’s Vlysses). Of course, new combina- 
tions may emerge as the narrative develops, but there is no final 
combination that functions as an organizing principle of the story as a 
whole. Any final solution would be in contradiction with the open- 
ended nature of the polyphonic novel. 
THE SELF AS AN ORGANIZED PROCESS OF VALUATION: 
THE METHOD OF SELF-CONFRONTATION 
In this section, I present the concept of valuation as an active I pro- 
cess of meaning construction of a narrative kind and introduce a self- 
confrontation method in order to study the self-narrative as multivoiced. 
This theory and method provide a framework for the study of an 
empirical finding, the phenomenon of dominance reversal, or an un- 
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Opposites in a Dialogical Self 13 
expected and drastic change in the dominance relation between op- 
posed positions in the self. For more comprehensive discussion and 
illustration of the self-confrontation method for assessing valuations 
and their change over time, see Hermans (1995) and Hermans and 
Hermans-Jansen (1995). 
Valuation System: Self as a Composite 
of Narrative Fragments 
Valuation theory (Hermans, 1987a, 1987b, 1988,1989; Hermans & Van 
Gilst, 1991) was originally developed for the study of individual expe- 
riences, their ordering into a narrative structure, and their develop- 
ment over time. In this theory, inspired by James (1890) and Merleau- 
Ponty (1945/1962), the self is conceived of as an organized process of 
valuation. The process aspect refers to the historical nature of human 
experience and implies a specific spatiotemporal orientation: The em- 
bodied person lives in the present and is therefore oriented toward 
the past and the future from a specific point or position in time and 
space. The organizational aspect is intended to emphasize that the 
person, through the process of self-reflection, creates a composite whole 
containing contrasting experiences associated with different positions 
in time and space. 
The central concept of valuation is an active process of construc- 
tion of personal meaning and reflects the agentic character of the I. It 
is an open concept and includes anything people find to be of impor- 
tance in the process of selecting and organizing the events as parts of 
their self-narratives. A valuation is any unit of meaning that has a 
positive (pleasant), negative (unpleasant), or ambivalent (both pleas- 
ant and unpleasant) value in the eyes of the individual. It includes a 
broad range of phenomena: a precious memory, an impressive event, 
a difficult problem, a beloved person, an unreachable goal, the antici- 
pated death of a significant other, and so forth. In the process of self- 
reflection, specific valuations are selected and organized into a system. 
Depending on the individual's position in space and time, different 
valuations may emerge. 
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, it is assumed that 
the self is multivoiced with different characters, each having his or 
her own story to tell. This means that the self can be conceived of as 
an imaginal landscape composed of different I positions. That is, the I 
has the possibility to move, as in a space, from one position to an- 
other, to and fro, in accordance with changes in the situation. As 
different voices, these positioned 7s may tell stories about their re- 
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14 H. J. M. Hermans 
spedive Mes and their worlds, resulting in a complex, narratively structured 
dialogical self. The different I positions function as different centers of 
self-organization and consequently construe different valuation sys- 
tems. Because the positions in the self are not of equal dominance, 
one valuation system may have a more prominent place in the self as 
a whole than the other systems. 
The Self-Confrontation Method: 
Construing Opposing Systems of Valuations 
For present purposes, an adapted version of the self-confrontation 
method, based on valuation theory, is devised. The self-confrontation 
method is an idiographic instrument that invites the individual to 
investigate his or her valuation system in collaboration with a psy- 
chologist (Hermans, 1987b, 1988, 1991). The procedure includes three 
steps: 
1. Identification of two opposing positions in the self that are cur- 
rently relevant in the subject’s life; 
2. Formulation of a valuation system from the perspective of each 
position separately; and 
3. Assessment of the cognitive, affective, and behavioral implica- 
tions of the valuations of the two systems. 
To understand the procedure, consider the following example. 
First, a subject is invited to select two opposing sides of her personal- 
ity, with one side more or less dominating the other. Suppose the 
subject chooses “my open side” and ”my closed side” as opposites, 
with the open side as dominant. 
Next, a series of open-ended questions (Table 1) is presented to 
the subject for the elicitation of her valuations. The questions ask for 
relevant issues from the past, present, and future. They invite the 
subject to reflect on her life situation in such a way that she feels free 
to mention those concerns that are most relevant from her present 
perspective. She is encouraged to phrase the valuations in her own 
terms so that the formulation reflects her intended meaning. The typi- 
cal form of the valuation is a sentence. For present purposes, the 
subject is invited to formulate six valuations from the perspective of 
her “open” position (two valuations referring to her past, two refer- 
ring to her present, and two referring to her future). Then, the same 
questions in Table 1 are read again to the subject, but this time the 
subject is asked to formulate six valuations from the perspective of 
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Opposites in a Dialogical Self 15 
TABLE 1 Questions of the Self-confrontation Method 
Set 1: The past 
These questions are intended to guide you to some aspect of your past life that is 
of great importance to you. 
Was there something in your past that has been of major importance or 
significance for your life and that still plays an important part today? 
Was there, in the past, a person or persons, an experience, or a circumstance 
that greatly influenced your life and still appreciably affects your present 
existence? 
Your are free to go back into the past as far as you like. 
Set 2: The present 
This set is also composed of two questions that will lead you, after a certain 
amount of thinlang, to formulate a response: 
Is there in your present life something that has major importance for or great 
influence on your existence? 
Is there in your present life a person or persons or a circumstance that exerts a 
significant influence on you? 
Set 3: Thefuture 
The following questions are again intended to guide you to a response: 
Do you foresee something that will have major importance for or great influence 
on your future life? 
Do you feel that a person or persons or a circumstance will have a great 
influence on your future life? 
Is there a future goal or abject that you expect to play an important role in your 
life? 
You are free to look as far ahead as you wish. 
her “closed position. (Note that there is no one-to-one relation be- 
tween question and answer. The questions are used simply to invite 
the person to self-reflect.) 
Next, the subject is invited to concentrate on the week prior to 
the investigation and rate (on a 0-9 scale) each of the 12 valuations 
according to two dimensions: (a) how dominant the particular valua- 
tion has been in her thinking, feeling, and action (“the influence a 
particular valuation had on your thinking, feeling, or action, such that 
it suppresses other thoughts, feelings, and actions”) and (b) how meun- 
in&Z the particular valuation has been for her thinking, feeling, and 
action (”To what extent was this valuation meaningful, that is, to what 
extent did it contribute to the quality of your life?”). 
Finally, the subject is asked to keep a diary for 3 weeks. That is, at 
the end of each day, she concentrates for a while on the two sets of 
valuations, relates them to the events of that day, and keeps daily 
notes about the process as a whole. At the end of the week, she again 
rates all valuations on dominance and meaningfulness, and this is 
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16 H. J. M. Hermans 
continued for 3 full weeks after the self-investigation. After these 3 
weeks, during which there is no contact between subject and investi- 
gator, the investigator receives the diary from the subject (with her 
self-reflections at the end of each day) and the weekly judgments on 
dominance and meaningfulness (the first is a baseline, and the sec- 
ond, third, and fourth are successive assessments). In a final session, 
after the 3-week period, the investigator discusses the results with the 
subject and asks for some additional information. 
THE PHENOMENON OF DOMINANCE REVERSAL 
The idiographic study presented here is part of a larger project on 
human valuation (Hermans, 1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1992a, 199213, 1992~). 
The subject, Nicole, a 23-year-old woman, is a part-time social worker 
in an institution for delinquents. She has no psychiatric history, and 
has never been in psychotherapy. Together with other people, she 
volunteered because she was interested in the project, and she did 
not receive any financial or material reward. 
In response to the investigator’s question concerning two oppo- 
site sides of her personality, Nicole explained that she saw herself as 
mainly being a ”self-assertive” person but as having a less dominant, 
“anxious-uncertain” side as well. Responding to the same set of ques- 
tions (Table 1) from the two positions, Nicole formulated two com- 
pletely different sets of valuations referring to different memories of 
the past, different concerns in the present, and different expectations 
of the future (Table 2). The valuations from the self-assertive position 
mainly represented a fairly optimistic outlook on the world, whereas 
the valuations from the uncertain-anxious position referred to more 
negative experiences. At the same time, the valuations were not sim- 
ply different in the way that the valuation systems of two unrelated 
people may be different. Rather, the two “characters” opposed one 
another in a dialogical way, sometimes even disagreeing with each 
other (e.g., Valuations 3 and 10, and 6 and 11, in Table 2). 
The dominance and meaningfulness of the valuations of the two 
positions are presented in Figure 1, which compares mean dominance 
ratings for the six valuations of the self-assertive position with mean 
dominance ratings for the six valuations of the uncertain-anxious po- 
sition at four successive measurements (Times 1 4 ) .  Figure l also shows 
the mean ratings for meaningfulness at the same four measurements. 
At Time 1, the valuations of Nicole’s self-assertive I were, as a 
group, higher in dominance than the valuations of her closed I .  This 
result, representing the baseline, was expected, given that Nicole her- 
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Opposites in a Dialogical Self 17 
TABLE 2 Valuations from the Self-Assertive and the Uncertain-Anxious Positions 
Valuations from the self-assertive position 
Past 
Present 
Future 
Past 
Present 
Future 
1. As the oldest, I've always carried much responsibility for my younger 
sister; this has laid the basis for caring and feeling responsible for 
others. 
2. When I want to achieve something, I often choose the hardest way 
(e.g., combining studies, chairing the student league, and an active 
social life); when this succeeds, I become more self-assertive. 
3. I have a relationship with a man in which I can totally be myself (in 
both my good and bad moods) and be accepted, and I derive 
certainty from that. 
4. After a period in which I felt threatened by an ex-patient, I have 
deliberately looked for another living place; there I have found my 
rest and freedom again. 
5. I am aspiring to a leadership position; 1 am planning to pursue 
management training, so that I can start with this job after about 8 
years from now. 
6. Although my boyfriend also has a relationship with another woman, I 
expect that he will eventually choose me, so that we will have a 
future together. 
Valuations from the uncertain-anxious position 
7. Only now has my mother started to tell what happened in her family 
(e.g., incest): This contrasts sharply with the warm and enriching 
education I have enjoyed. 
8. The experiences my mother is telling of evoke in me anxiety about 
her as a child and respect and appreciation for the person she is now. 
9. After a very difficult period, my sister has started to travel together 
with her friend, so that I am missing a period of her development. 
Being involved with her, I want to care and to control; if this is not 
possible, I feel scared, uncertain, and jealous. 
evokes in me feelings of loneliness, powerlessness, dependency, and 
jealousy. 
10. The fact that my relationship [with her boyfriend] is illegitimate 
11. If my friend does not choose me, this relationship will break me so 
that my trust in relationships will be gone, and also the basic trust in 
myself. 
12. I am scared that somebody who is dear to me will suddenly die ( e g ,  
my parents, sister, or a friend), so that I no longer have the situation 
under control and feel loneliness, sorrow, pain, and desolation. 
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DOMINANCE 
H. J. M. Hermans 
THINKING 
assertive 
uncertain - 
i i i k  
MEANINGFULNESS 
THINKING 
1 2 3 4  
FEELING 
1 2 3 4  
1 2 3 4  
ACTION 
1 2 3 4  
ACllON 
1 2 3 4  
FIGURE 1 
the self-assertive and uncertain-anxious positions at Times 1-4. 
Dominance and meaningfulness ratings of thinlung, feeling, and action for 
self had selected the two positions as differing in dominance. The 
differences were in the expected direction for thinking, feeling, and 
action, although they were largest for action. The extremely low domi- 
nance level of the uncertain position for action at Time 1 suggests that 
Nicole did not express the uncertain-anxious part of her self in her 
behavior. 
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Opposites in a Dialogical Self 19 
The most conspicuous finding, however, was the strong upward 
tendency of the uncertain-anxious position, and the strong down- 
ward tendency of the self-assertive position, with a crossing of the 
lines at Time 2 or between Times 2 and 3. These tendencies and 
crossings were consistently found for thinking, feeling, and action. In 
the period of study, the initial dominance of the self-assertive position 
was followed by a successive dominance of the uncertain-anxious 
position. In this crossing of the lines, the phenomenon of dominance 
reversal was reflected. The question can be asked, however, to what 
extent such a reversal has significance or meaning for the person. This 
question may be answered by inspection of the meaningfulness rat- 
ings. 
The results for meaningfulness, at the lower part of Figure 1, are 
basically the same as those for dominance. Again, we see a decrease 
for the self-assertive position, an increase for the uncertain-anxious 
position, and a crossing of the two lines between Times 2 and 3. 
Although the valuations of the self-assertive position were highly mean- 
ingful at Time 1, they decreased in meaningfulness over time, where- 
as the valuations of the uncertain-anxious position tended toward 
an increase in meaningfulness. Note that although the self-assertive 
position included typically positive (pleasant) valuations and the un- 
certain-anxious position mainly negative (unpleasant) valuations, the 
former showed a decrease in meaningfulness and the latter some in- 
crease in meaningfulness. 
In her final discussion with the investigator after the 3-week pe- 
riod, Nicole said she was aware of the increased involvement in her 
uncertain-anxious position but was not able to point to one main 
event that could account for this change. Inspection of her diary led 
to similar conclusions. In the first 2 weeks of the investigation, she 
referred alternately to valuations from the two positions, without empha- 
sizing one event that could account for the uncertain-anxious position’s 
increased dominance and the self-assertive position’s decreased domi- 
nance. 
The finding of dominance reversal is in agreement with findings 
from another subject (Hermans & Kempen, 1993), who also showed a 
clear dominance reversal in the absence of a particular event that 
could be considered the cause of this reversal. The most plausible 
interpretation is that during the process of communicative self-reflec- 
tion (as in the self-confrontation procedure), a subordinate position, 
granted a voice, asks for more attention than usual and, in fact, re- 
ceives more explicit attention than earlier. As a result, this position 
becomes more salient in the person’s self-organization than the posi- 
tion that was originally dominant. 
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20 H. J. M. Hermans 
A more conspicuous development in Nicole’s case, however, was 
the simultaneous decrease of both positions between Times 3 and 4, 
in both dominance and meaningfulness. What was the reason for the 
sudden and simultaneous decreases? At the beginning of the week, 
between Times 3 and 4, Nicole wrote, 
By reading the valuations over and over and by being concerned 
with them, 1 am becoming aware that I am feeling less and less 
happy with the complex relationship that I have with my boyfriend 
[see Valuations 10 and 11 in Table 21. Friday night was therefore 
very crucial. . . . The man who brought me home [someone other 
than her boyfriend] was allowed to stay. I have known this man for 
a long time, as a good friend of my cousin. Over the last days we 
have had a lot of contact, spending many hours in telephone con- 
versation. This contact makes me feel good, but it also creates a lot 
of confusion. I feel restless and fearful, because I do not have my 
emotions under control. The freedom that I am supposed to have in 
the relationship with my boyfriend [Valuation 31 is simply not there. 
. . . It becomes more and more clear to me that I do not want to 
have a relationship in this way and I feel a very strong need to keep 
my boyfriend at a distance. At this moment I feel strong enough to 
say to him . . . I hope that I can hold onto this feeling, because I 
finally want to cut the knot, as he is not able to do this. 
Two days later, her boyfriend visited her and she related this 
meeting in the diary: 
Yesterday evening my boyfriend came. I had a very difficult day 
behind me and finally wanted to cut the knot. I felt very strong in 
this. When he was there, I could not express one word. After 10 
minutes of silence, I started to cry very hard. I made it clear to him 
that I do not want to go on in this way, that I can’t! I’ve told him 
also about the other man. . . . It’s suddenly so clear to me that I 
can’t bear this relation [with her boyfriend] any longer. 
Two days later, she concluded, “For two long years I did not dare 
to make this step. For a part, being involved in this self-investigation 
has helped me to get clear that I can’t bear this situation.” One day 
later, she decided also to distance herself from the second man, with 
whom she had entered into a close relationship: 
Yesterday evening the other man came over for dinner. I felt very 
bad. He was very sweet to me. I fought against my sorrow and 
therefore couldn’t get in touch with my emotions. A lot of talking, a 
lot of wine; he spent the night . . . all very confusing. I’ve slept for 
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Opposites in a Dialogical Self 21 
some 20 minutes. This morning it became clear to me that it is all 
going too quick, he is getting too close. I made this clear to him, 
which was painful for him. I’ve put him at a distance. The initiative 
is from me . . . I am now taking the time to work out my sorrow. I 
am aware that I must do this alone . . . . This morning I was very 
scared to go to my work . . . , afraid of questions, afraid that I 
would not be strong enough. I was at the point of calling in sick 
. . . However, this is not my style. I went, worked very hard and 
came home very tired. I canceled my appointments for tonight. . . . 
I am suppressing my sorrow very strongly. 
As the last notes suggest, Nicole felt under threat of becoming 
overwhelmed by the negative feelings implied by the second position, 
the uncertain-anxious side, and therefore suppressed these feelings in 
order to maintain herself. Although the valuations of the uncertain- 
anxious position were increasingly influential and reached a peak in 
dominance at Time 3, there was a remarkable decrease in their domi- 
nance at Time 4. This bending of dominance can therefore be under- 
stood as part of a process of self-organization: By suppressing the 
valuations of the uncertain-anxious position, Nicole countered the threat 
of disorganization of the self as a whole. 
The preceding notes from the diary suggest that the drastic changes 
in dominance and meaningfulness, including Nicole’s decision to break 
off the relationship with her boyfriend, were not reducible to any 
form of efficient causation. Take, for example, the influence of the 
second man. Can his influence be considered the cause of the remark- 
able changes in dominance and meaningfulness? The answer must be 
that this man did not function as the sole cause, and not even as the 
primary cause. Nicole related that before she slept with this man, she 
had increasingly felt bad in the relationship with her boyfriend, mak- 
ing her more open to the man’s overtures. This increase of bad feeling 
was, in turn, preceded by the process of self-reflection that was part 
of the self-investigation. The notes in the diary, rather than pointing 
to a specific causal influence, suggest a highly complex process of self- 
organization with a multitude of interacting forces. 
In fact, this idiographic study reveals two principles at work that 
were discussed at the beginning of this article. The principle of ten- 
sion reduction, which received much attention from early social psy- 
chologists, is manifest in the simultaneous decrease in dominance of 
the two positions in this case. The idea that polar opposites are mutu- 
ally complementing, emphasized by a diversity of clinical theorists, 
received equally empirical support in our study. The uncertain- 
anxious position, although associated mainly with negative and pessi- 
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22 H. J. M. Hermans 
mistic valuations, was experienced as increasingly meaningful when it 
became more dominant in the self. This also suggests that this (un- 
pleasant) position was felt as belonging to the self as an intrinsic and 
valuable counterpart, like the countermelody in a polyphonic compo- 
sition or the antagonist in the polyphonic novel. 
THE SELF AS A PROCESS OF ORGANIZATION 
AND REORGANIZATION 
On the basis of the notion of the dialogical self, contrasting poles of a 
personal construct may be conceived of as voiced I positions that not 
only are intersubjectively related, but also differ in their relative domi- 
nance. As I positions the construct poles may be ”juxtaposed in a 
self-investigation and both invited to tell their own story about them- 
selves in terms of a system of valuations. In the idiographic study 
presented to illustrate this theoretical framework, the relative domi- 
nance and meaningfulness of the valuations of the positions were 
followed over time and a drastic change in the dominance relations, 
labeled a “dominance reversal,” was observed. Although the change 
in the relative dominance of the two positions was radical, it was not 
possible to find an external event that could be considered the sole 
cause of the reversal in terms of an antecedentxonsequent relation- 
ship. Even the simultaneous decrease in the dominance of both posi- 
tions seen in the last week of the investigation was not simply attrib- 
utable to one specific external event. As the diary notes suggested, 
this change was rather part of the subject’s decision to break off the 
relationship with her boyfriend, a decision that was made in a turbu- 
lent period of her life. Given the lack of clear causality, what is the 
nature of this change and what are its theoretical implications for the 
psychology of the self? In order to address this question, it may be 
profitable to return to the fertile work of William James. 
In Varieties of Religious Experience (1902/1982), James was even more 
interested in the phenomenon of radical change than he was in his 
earlier work. He was interested not only in the religious conversions 
and counterconversions of historical figures, but also in instances of 
sudden change in the selves of ordinary people. An example is his 
discussion of a case of ”falling out of love.” It concerned a man who 
suddenly stopped his relationship with a woman with whom he had 
fallen in love 2 years previously. When the man looked back to this 
period, he described that he had fallen violently in love with a woman 
who had ”a spirit of coquetry.” Although he secretly knew that she 
was not the right person for him, he fell into a regular fever and 
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Opposites in a Dialogical Self 23 
could think of nothing else. After a long period of being plagued by 
jealousy and contempt for his own uncontrollable weakness, there 
was a sudden change: 
The queer thing was the sudden and unexpected way in which it all 
stopped. I was going to my work after breakfast one morning, thinking 
as usual of her and of my misery, when, just as if some outside 
power laid hold of me, I found myself turning round and almost 
running to my room, where I immediately got out all the relics of 
her which I possessed, including some hair, all her notes and letters, 
and ambrotypes on glass. The former I made a fire of, the latter I 
actually crushed beneath my heel, in a sort of fierce joy of revenge 
and punishment. I now loathed and despised her altogether, and as 
for myself I felt as if a load of disease had suddenly been removed 
from me. That was the end. (James, 1902J1982, p. 180, emphasis 
added) 
James considered this case “an unusually clear example of two differ- 
ent levels of personality, inconsistent in their dictates, yet so well 
balanced against each other as for a long time to fill the life with 
discord and dissatisfaction” (p. 180). James used the phrase “unstable 
equilibrium” to characterize the specific organization of the self: “At 
last, not gradually, but in a sudden crisis, the unstable equilibrium is 
resolved (p. 180). (For a recent discussion of the notion of equilib- 
rium in the self, see Schwalbe, 1991). 
What James described in terms of “two different layers of person- 
ality” I phrase in the present framework as two opposing I positions. 
Whereas in James’s case a reversal of two layers occurred after a 
period of unstable equilibrium, in the case of Nicole there was a domi- 
nance reversal of two positions. There is also a significant difference 
between James’s description and mine. Whereas James described a 
person showing a radical change in a spontaneous crisis, Nicole initi- 
ated a dominance reversal in a period of explicit and systematic self- 
reflection arranged in a project conducted conjointly by psychologist 
and subject. The data from the idiographic study of Nicole suggest 
that if one pole of a pair of opposites is subordinated or suppressed in 
a particular period, it may become strongly dominant at some later 
point in time. Although we do not fully understand what precisely 
determines the reversal of dominance, when it takes place, and by 
whom it takes place, the reversal phenomenon points to the relevance 
of dynamic psychological conceptions of the self, in which the possi- 
bility of radical change of oppositional poles in seemingly stable self- 
narratives is taken into account. The existence of the reversal phe- 
nomenon suggests that people’s usual self-definition is based on a 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
ad
bo
ud
 U
niv
ers
ite
it N
ijm
eg
en
] a
t 0
2:0
5 2
7 A
pri
l 2
01
5 
24 H. J. M. Hermans 
temporary equilibrium of bipolar structures, rather than on unipolar 
stability of traits. 
It is in the spirit of recent psychological discussions of the self to 
concentrate not only on its stability, consistency, and coherence, but 
also on the possible fertility of its instability, inconsistency, and inco- 
herence (e.g., Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Sampson, 1985; Schwalbe, 
1991). Already some decades ago, one of the most prolific writers on 
the subject, Gordon Allport, argued for the necessity of studying the 
self in its dynamic and organizational aspects. In Becoming (1954), Allport's 
emphasis was clearly on the unity and synthesis of the self. However, 
speaking about the "complexity and liability of the organizational pro- 
cess," Allport remarked, 
Becoming is not a mere matter of forging links to a chain. It some- 
times involves the shifting of dominance from segmental systems to 
comprehensive systems, or from one comprehensive system to an- 
other. Just why or how such shifts occur we cannot say. When they 
are better understood we can align them with our discussions of 
determinism and freedom. (Allport, 1954, p. 87) 
I expect that one of psychology's future challenges will be to illu- 
minate unpredictable but significant moments of becoming. 
REFERENCES 
Adler, A. (1922). uber den nervosen Charakter [On the nervous character] (3rd ed.). Miinchen, 
Allport, G. W. (1954). Becoming: Basic considerations for a psychologv ofpersonality. New 
Angyal, A. (1965). Neurosis and treatment: A holistic theory. New York: Wiley. 
Aronsson, K., & Rundstrh, B. (1988). Child discourse and parental control in pediatric 
Bakan, D. (1966). The duality of human existence. Chicago: Rand-McNally. 
Bakhtin, M. (1973). Problems of Dostoyevskyk poetics (2nd ed.). R. W. Rotsel, Trans. Ann 
Berne, E. (1972). Whar do you say afrer you say hello? New York: Grove Press. 
Bruner, J. (1985). Vygotsky: A historical and conceptual perspective. In J. V. Wertsch (Ed.), 
Culture, communication and cognition: Vygotskian perspectives (pp. 2 1-34). Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press. 
Bruner, J. S. (1986). Actual minds, possible worlds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Cassirer, E. (1955). The philosophy of symbolic forms: Vol. 2. Mythical thought. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press. 
Caughey, J. L. (1984). Imaginary social worlds: A cultural approach. Lincoln, N E :  Univer- 
sity of Nebraska Press. 
Deikman, A. J. (1971). Bimodal consciousness. Archives of General Psychiatty 25, 481489. 
Germany: Berg-mann. 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
consultations. Text, 8, 159-189. 
Arbor, MI: Ardis. (Original work published 1929) 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
ad
bo
ud
 U
niv
ers
ite
it N
ijm
eg
en
] a
t 0
2:0
5 2
7 A
pri
l 2
01
5 
Opposites in a Dialogical Self 25 
Deikman, A. J. (1976). Bimodal consciousness and the mystic experience. In Ph. R. Lee, 
R. E. Ornstein, D. Galin, A. J. Deikman, & Ch. T. Tart (Eds.), Symposium on conscious- 
ness (pp. 67-88). New York: Viking Press. 
Fairbairn, W. R. D. (1952). Psychoanalytic studies ofthe personality. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. 
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. London: Tavistock. 
Florenskaya, T. A. (1989). Psychological problems of dialogue in light of the ideas of M. M. 
Fowler, J. (1981). Stages offaith. New York: Harper & Row. 
Gergen, K. J., & Gergen, M. M. (1988). Narrative and the self as relationship. Advances in 
Gregg, G. S. (1991). Self-representation: LiJe narrative studies in identity and ideology. New 
Guntrip, H. (1971). Psychoanalytic theory, therapy, and the self: New York: Basic Books. 
Gutmann, D. L. (1980). The post-parental years: Clinical problems and developmental possi- 
es. In W. H. Norman & T. J.  Scaramella (Eds.), Mid-life: Developmental and clinical 
H a d ,  R., & Van Langenhove, L. (1991). Varieties of positioning. Journal for the Theory of 
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley. 
Hermans, H. J. M. (1987a). Self as organized system of valuations: Toward a dialogue with 
Hermans, H. J.  M. (1987b). The dream in the process of valuation: A method of interpreta- 
Hermans, H. J. M. (1988). On the integration of idiographic and nomothetic research method 
Hermans, H. J. M. (1989). The meaning of life as an organized process. Psychotherapy, 26, 
Hermans, H. J. M. (1991). The person as co-investigator in self-research: Valuation theory. 
Hermans, H. J. M. (1992a). The person as an active participant in psychological research. 
Hermans, H. J. M. (1992b). Telling and retelling one's self-narrative: A contextual approach 
Hermans, H. J. M. (1992~).  Unhappy self-esteem: A meaningful exception to the rule. Journal 
Hermans, H. J. M. (1995). From assessment to change: The personal meaning of clinical 
problems in the context of self-narrative. In R. A. Neimeyer & M. J .  Mahoney (Eds.), 
Constructivism in psychotherapy (pp. 247-272). Washington, DC: American Psychologi- 
cal Association. 
Hermans, H. J. M. & Hermans-Jansen, E. (1995). Self-narratives: The construction ofmean- 
ing in psychotherapy. New York: Guilford Press. 
Hermans, H. J. M., & Kempen, H. J. G. (1993). The dialogical self: Meaning as movement. 
San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Hermans, H. J. M., Kempen, H. J. G., & Van Loon, R. J. P. (1992). The dialogical self: 
Beyond individualism and rationalism. American Psychologist, 47, 23-33. 
Hermans, H. J. M., & Van Gilst, W. (1991). Self-narrative and collective myth: An analysis of 
the Narcissus story. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science, 23, 423-440. 
Jacobson, E. (1964). The self and the object world. New York: International Universities 
Press. 
James, W. (1890). 7Ee principles ofpsychofogy (Vol. I). New York: Macmillan. 
Bakhtin and A. A. Ukhtomskii. Soviet Psychology, 27, 2 9 4 0 .  
Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 17-56. 
York: Greenwood Press. 
issues (pp. 38-52). New York: Brunerhlazel. 
Social Behavior, 21, 393407.  
the person. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 34, 10-19. 
tion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 163-175. 
in the study of personal meaning. Journal of Personality, 56, 785-812. 
11-22. 
European Journal of Personality, 5, 21 7-234. 
American Behavioral Scientist, 36, 102-1 13. 
to life-span development. Human Development, 35, 361-375. 
of Psychology 126, 555-570. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
ad
bo
ud
 U
niv
ers
ite
it N
ijm
eg
en
] a
t 0
2:0
5 2
7 A
pri
l 2
01
5 
26 H. J. M. Hermans 
James, W. (1982). The varieties of religious experience: A study in human nature. New York: 
Jung, C. G. (1959). Mandalas. In Collected works (Vol. 9, Part 1). Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
Kelly, G. A. (1955). The psychology of personal constructs. New York: Norton. 
Klages, L. (1948). Charakterkunde [Characterology]. Zurich, Switzerland: Hirzel. 
Klein, M. (1948). Contributions to psychoanalysis 1921-1945. London: Hogarth Press. 
Linell, P. (1990). The power of dialogue dynamics. In I. Markovh & K. Foppa (Eds.), The 
Loevinger, J. (1976). Ego development. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
McAdams, D. P. (1985). The “imago”: A key narrative component of identity. In P. Shaver 
(Ed.), Self; situations, and social behavior. Review of personality and social psychology 
(Vol. 6,  pp. 115-141). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology ofperception (C. Smith, Trans.). London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul. (Original work published 1945) 
Osgood, C. E., & Tannenbaum, P. H. (1955). The principle of congruity in the prediction of 
attitude change. Psychological Review, 62, 42-55. 
Sampson, E. E. (1985). The decentralization of identity: Toward a revised concept of personal 
and social order. American Psychologist, 11, 1203-121 1. 
Sampson, E. E. (1993). Identity politics: Challenges to psychology’s understanding. American 
Sarbin, Th. R. (1986). The narrative as a root metaphor for psychology. In Th. R. Sarbin 
(Ed.), Narrative psychology: The storied nature of human conduct (pp. 3-21). New York: 
Praeger. 
Sarbin, Th. R. (1990). The narrative quality of action. Theoretical and Philosophical Psychol- 
Sarbin, Th. R., & Mancuso, J. C. (1983). The self-narrative in the enactment of roles. In Th. 
R. Sarbin & K. Scheibe (Eds.), Studies in social identiv (pp. 254-273). New York: Praeger. 
Schwalbe, M. L. (1991). The autogenesis of the self. Journal for the Theory of Social Behuv- 
ior, 21, 269-295. 
Steiner, C. M. (1974). Scripts people live. New York: Grove Press. 
Sullivan, H. S. (1953). The interpersonal theory of psychiatry. New York: Norton. 
Vasil’eva, I. I. (1988). The importance of M. M. Bakhtin’s idea of dialogue and dialogic 
Warneck, M. (1909). Der Religion der Batak [The religion of the Batak]. Leipzig, Germany: 
Watkins, M. (1986). Invisible guests: The development of imaginal dialogues. Hillsdale, NJ: 
Wertsch, J. V. (1991). Voices of the mind: A sociocultural approach to mediated action. 
Wrong, D. (1968). Some problems in defining social power. American Journal of Sociology, 
Penguin Books. (Original work published 1902) 
University Press. 
dynamics of dialogue (pp. 147-177). New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Psychologist, 48, 1219-1230. 
ogy, 1 0 , 4 9 4 5 .  
relations for the psychology of communication. Soviet Psychology, 26(3), 17-3 I .  
Weicher. 
Erlbaum. 
London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
73, 673-681. D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
ad
bo
ud
 U
niv
ers
ite
it N
ijm
eg
en
] a
t 0
2:0
5 2
7 A
pri
l 2
01
5 
